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This article summarizes developments in international litigation during
2017.
I.

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Foreign states are presumptively immune from suit, and their property
presumptively immune from attachment and execution, unless an exception
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) applies.'
A.

JURISDICTIONAL EXCEPTIONS

In De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, the D.C. Circuit reconciled an
apparent intra-circuit conflict regarding the application of the expropriation
exception to Hungary's seizures of Jewish property during the Holocaust,
reversing in part the district court's decision and dismissing Hungary from
the case on grounds of sovereign immunity.2 The D.C. Circuit held that,
with respect to a foreign state defendant, commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the state itself (and not, as plaintiffs argued, the state's
* The article was edited by Aaron Marr Page, managing attorney at Forum Nobis PLLC in
Washington, D.C. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP partners Jonathan I. Blackman, in
New York and London, and Carmine D. Boccuzzi, in New York, authored Sections I and VII,
with assistance from James Blakemore, Ellie Norton, Alyssa Helfer, and Guilherme Duraes,
associates at the same firm. (The firm represents the company Clearstream Banking S.A.,
referenced in Section I.) Theodore J. Folkman, a shareholder at Murphy & King in Boston and
author of LETTERS BLOGATORY: THE BLOG OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE,
authored Section II. Phillip B. Dye, Jr., a partner at Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. in Houston, Texas,
authored Sections III and VIII, with assistance from Liane Noble and Page Somerville
Robinson, associates at the same firm. Matthew D. Slater, a partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton LLP in Washington, D.C., authored Section IV, with assistance from associate
Caroline Stanton and law clerk Brandon Levey of the same firm. Howard S. Zelbo, a partner at
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York, authored Section V, with assistance from
associate Paul Kleist and law clerk Katie Gonzalez of the same firm. Igor V. Timofeyev,
Charles A. Patrizia, and Joseph R. Profaizer, partners at Paul Hastings LLP in Washington,
D.C., authored Section VI and IX, with assistance from Kate Lee, an associate at the same firm.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.
2. 859 F.3d 1094, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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agencies or instrumentalities) is a necessary condition to satisfaction of the
expropriation exception.3 The court explained that throughout the Act the
"FSIA carefully distinguishes foreign states from their agencies and
instrumentalities," and that "[c]ollapsing the well-worn distinction" would
make little sense given the realities of sovereign litigation.4 The court,
however, instructed the district court to grant the plaintiffs leave to amend
their complaint in light of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act,
enacted during the pendency of the appeal.5
In Funk v.Belneftekhim, the Second Circuit found that the district court
exceeded its discretion when, as a discovery sanction, it struck the
defendants' claim of foreign sovereign immunity.6 The district court twice
ordered limited jurisdictional discovery to resolve whether the primary
defendant was immune from suit as an agency or instrumentality of Belarus.7
When monetary sanctions failed to induce the defendants' compliance with
the discovery orders, the district court struck the sovereign immunity
defense to put the plaintiffs in "the same position [they] would have been in
absent the wrongful withholding of evidence."s After finding it had
appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, the Second Circuit
held that the district court had abused its discretion, reasoning that by
striking the sovereign immunity defense the district court risked
impermissibly conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on itself where none
existed.9
B.

EXECUTION EXCEPTIONS

In Peterson v. Islamic Republic ofIran, judgment creditors of Iran sought the
turnover of certain bond proceeds processed in New York by Clearstream
Banking, S.A., and ultimately "recorded as a right to payment in
Luxembourg" in the account of an entity acting on behalf of Markazi, Iran's
central bank.10 The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and held that a New York court may
order "a non-sovereign third party to recall to New York extraterritorial
assets owned by a foreign sovereign."" The court reasoned that
Clearstream, as a non-sovereign entity, does not possess sovereign
immunity, and FSIA Section 1609 grants immunity from execution only to
assets located "in the United States," and thus not to a right to payment
located in Luxembourg.2 The Second Circuit emphasized "that the
3. Id. at 1107.
4. Id. at 1107-08.
5. Id. at 1110.
6. 861 F.3d 354, 371 (2d Cir. 2017).
7. Id.at 361-61.
8. Id.at 362.
9. Id. at 370-71.
10. 876 F.3d 63, 84 (2nd Cir. 2017).
11. Id.at 92.
12. Id.at 91-92.
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plaintiffs are by no means assured success upon remand," due, among other
things, to the potential barriers to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Clearstream, state law limitations on the turnover remedy, and the
application of international comity. 13 The court also noted that recall of the
assets to the United States would be inappropriate if it could be shown that
the assets, once in the United States, did not satisfy the FSIA requirement
14
that they are being "used for a commercial activity.'
II.

International Service of Process

This year, the Supreme Court finally resolved the long-standing circuit
split regarding the meaning of Article 10(a) of the Hague Service
Convention, which provides that the Convention "shall not interfere with" a
party's "freedom to 'send' judicial documents directly to persons abroad" by
postal channels.'1 Some circuits had held that Article 10(a) authorized or
permitted service of process by mail.16 Others had held that because Article
10(a) used the word "send," while other articles in the Service Convention
used the word "serve," Article 10(a) did not permit service of process by
mail.'7
In Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, on review from a Texas decision adopting
the minority position, the Supreme Court decisively resolved the conflict by
holding that Article 10(a) does indeed permit service of process by mail.Is
The Court further clarified that the provision permits but does not itself
affirmatively authorize service by mail, such that service of process by mail,
when the Service Convention applies, must be grounded in authority found
elsewhere in the law of the forum, not in the Convention itself. 9 If the law
of the forum imposes particular formal requirements (as federal procedural
law does, by requiring that the documents be addressed and dispatched by
the clerk2o), they must be followed. The Court thus remanded for
consideration of whether Texas procedural law authorized service by mail.
A potentially troublesome aspect of WaterSplash is its reliance on the view
that the Service Convention applies only to service of process and not to the
transmission of other judicial documents to litigants abroad.21 The Court
relied on the Service Convention's definition of its scope (it "app[lies] in all
13. Id. at 94-95.

14. Id. at 95.
15. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, art. 10(a), Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter
"Service Convention"].
16. See Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 02 (9th Cir. 2004); Ackermann v. Levine, 788
F.2d 830, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1986).
17. See Nuovo Pignone v. Storman Asia M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 385 (5th Cir. 2002); Bankston v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1989).
18. 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1513 (2017).
19. Id.
20. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(ii).
21. Water Splash, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1509.
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cases, in civil or commercial matters where there is occasion to transmit a
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad")22 to suggest that
"service" means service of process. While the Court found support for this
view in the seminal case of Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk,23 the view remains
potentially problematic. The word "service" is not restricted to service of
process in U.S. procedural law.24 And the French text of the Convention,
which the Court recognized as equally authentic,25 provides that the
Convention applies to the transmission of documents abroad "pour y ftre
signifle ou notiflLe"-"signification" or "notification."26 Documents other than
the writ of summons can be delivered by the less-formal "notification"
procedure under French law.27 Moreover, if the Court's view were correct,
it would be difficult to understand the Convention's reference to service of
extrajudicial documents, because a summons or another document that
constitutes "process" in the formal sense will always be a judicial document.
For these reasons, the accepted international view remains that the Service
Convention applies to all judicial documents, including "writs of summons,
the defendant's reply, decisions and judgments delivered by a member of a
judicial authority, as well as witness summons (subpoenas), and requests for
discovery of evidence sent to the parties."28 In practice, this point has
limited importance for U.S. practitioners, because after a defendant's
counsel enters an appearance, all documents are served on the (presumably
U.S.-based) lawyer.29 But the point may have real importance in cases of
recalcitrant foreign defendants, or defendants in default.

III. Personal Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court delivered two important opinions in 2017 clarifying
the distinct requirements for the exercise of general and specific personal
jurisdiction. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San
Francisco County, resident and non-resident plaintiffs filed suit in California
against Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), asserting claims based on injuries
allegedly caused by a BMS drug.30 The defendant moved to dismiss the
non-resident case for lack of personal jurisdiction, because the plaintiffs had
not alleged that they obtained the drug through California physicians or
22. Service Convention, supra note 15 at art. 1.
23. 486 U.S. 694, 701 (1988).
24. See, e.g.,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (requiring that all pleadings, motions, etc., be "served").
25. Water Splash, Inc.,137 S. Ct. at 1511.
26. Service Convention, supra note 15 at art. 1 (emphasis supplied).
27. For example, once a judgment has been rendered, the judgment is delivered to the parties
by notification, and the time for appeal runs from the date of the notification. See CODE DE
PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 87.
28. PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE SERVICE CONVENTION T 76-77 (4th ed.
2016).
29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1)-(2).
30. 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1777 (2017).
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from any California source, or that they were injured by the drug or were
treated for their injuries in California. 3' Applying the United States
Supreme Court's ground-breaking DaimlerAG v. Bauman decision,32 which
permits the exercise of general jurisdiction only in the forum in which a
corporation is fairly regarded as "at home," the California Supreme Court
held that general jurisdiction was lacking in California because BMS was
incorporated and headquartered outside of California and maintained its
most substantial operations outside of the state. 33 As to specific personal
jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court applied what it called a "sliding
scale approach to specific jurisdiction," under which "the more wide ranging
the defendant's forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection
between the forum contacts and the claim."34 Under the sliding scale
approach, the California Supreme Court concluded that California courts
could exercise specific jurisdiction because BMS had such extensive contacts
with California that a less direct connection between the forum and the
claims was required. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected this
"sliding scale approach" as unsupported by precedent and ultimately "a loose
and spurious form of general jurisdiction."35 (It agreed that California courts
lacked general jurisdiction under Daimler.) The Court concluded that "what
[was] needed-and what [was] missing here-[was] a connection between
the forum and the specific claims at issue."36 The decision illustrates the
Court's fidelity to a strict interpretation of Daimler, both on its face (general
jurisdiction) and as regards encroachment from a specific jurisdiction case
where the claim-specific forum connection requirement is not well met.
In a second important decision, the Supreme Court rejected a Montana
court's exercise of general personal jurisdiction, reiterating the Daimler
principle that "doing business" in a state was, alone, an insufficient basis
upon which to exert personal jurisdiction. BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell
involved two lawsuits brought in a Montana state court, by plaintiffs who
were not Montana residents and who were not injured in Montana, under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), a statute which permits
railway employees to sue their employer.37 Based on a venue provision in
the FELA permitting suit in a district where the defendant was "doing
business" and, alternatively, Montana's Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1),
which authorizes jurisdiction over "persons found" in Montana, the
Montana Supreme Court found that Montana courts could properly exercise
general jurisdiction. The Montana Supreme Court distinguished Daimler
on the ground that it was not "a FELA claim or a railroad defendant."38 The
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1778.
134 S. Ct. 746, 769 (2014).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1777 78.
Id. at 1778.
Id. at 1781.
Id.
137 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (2017).
Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 6, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017).
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that while "the business BNSF does in
Montana is sufficient to subject the railroad to specific personal jurisdiction
in that State on claims related to the business it does in Montana," the same
"in-state business, [as] clarified in Daimler and Goodyear, does not suffice to
permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims ... that are unrelated
39
to any activity occurring in Montana."
IV.

The Act of State Doctrine

The act of state doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of judicial
review, requiring U.S. courts to deem acts of foreign sovereigns taken within
their own jurisdictions as valid.40
A.

SCOPE

Courts continue to struggle to identify the acts that are subject to the
doctrine. In Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., a U.S.
company was sued for alleged copyright infringement based upon its
importing of proprietary data released to it by a Canadian government
agency. 41 The district court dismissed the claim based on the act of state
doctrine, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that the claim turned on
the defendant's importation, which the court could adjudicate without the
need to inquire into the legal validity of the Canadian agency's release of the
data.42 The Second Circuit addressed the issue in the context of
jurisdictional discovery in Funk v. Belneftekhim, holding that while the court
may not challenge the validity of the foreign laws that defendants claimed
established their sovereign immunity, the court could require discovery to
determine the completeness of the record on which the defendants relied
43
and evaluate whether it supported their claim.
This approach was echoed by federal district courts as well. In Integrated
Commc'ns & Techs. v.Hewlett-Packard Fin. Servs. Co., the court declined to
dismiss claims arising from the Chinese government's seizure of allegedly
counterfeit equipment and related criminal charges, because the U.S.
plaintiffs were seeking damages from private parties who supplied the goods,
the resolution of which would not require the U.S. court to challenge the
39. BNSF, 137 S.Ct. at 1559. The plaintiff in BNSF had also argued in the lower courts that
BNSF consented to jurisdiction by registering to do business in Montana. However, the
Supreme Court declined to reach the issue because the Montana Supreme Court had not
addressed it. Id. This is unfortunate because lower courts remain split on the question of
whether a defendant who is not "at home" in a forum state may nonetheless "consent" to
general jurisdiction by complying with that state's business registration statute. Compare Brown
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016) with Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v.
Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 769 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (O'Malley, J., concurring).
40. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Intl., 493 U.S. 400,
403 04 (1990); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
41. 850 F.3d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 2017).
42. Id. at 796-97.
43. Funk, 861 F.3d at 367 68.
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validity of the Chinese government's actions. 44 In United States v. Sum of
$70,990,605, a district court similarly declined to apply the act of state
doctrine in a civil forfeiture action concerning funds in a U.S. bank account
that were allegedly derived from accounts in Afghanistan.45 The court held
that while various Afghan governmental bodies had expressed views as to the
provenance of the funds in the Afghan accounts, none purported to
adjudicate the precise issues before the U.S. court, and that a foreign
government does not "act" when "it merely declares its position on an issue
that reaches beyond its borders and over which it lacks the power to dictate
any actual consequences."46 As further reason to deny application of the
doctrine, the court stated that the doctrine "should have little or no purchase
in litigation brought by the Executive Branch," particularly where the
underlying statute left discretion to the Executive Branch both whether to
commence the action and whether to suspend or terminate it in the national
interest.47
B.

COMMERCIAL ACTVITY EXCEPTION

At least two court decisions examined whether the doctrine applies to
"commercial activity" of foreign states. In dicta commentary (after finding
that the case was barred by the FSIA and the statute of limitations and that
plaintiff failed to state a claim based on alleged failure to pay on a bearer
bond), a New York district court noted that it was doubtful that the doctrine
would "apply to the purely commercial conduct of a foreign sovereign" and
that it would not apply when the conduct occurred outside of the foreign
state. 48 In contrast, in Nnaka v. FederalRepublic of Nigeria, the court found
that although claims stemming from Nigeria's alleged breach of a lawyer's
retention agreement fell within the commercial activities exception of the
FSIA, the act of state doctrine precluded the court from challenging the
propriety of two acts at the heart of the claim: (1) the Nigerian Attorney
General's referral of the plaintiff for criminal investigation in Nigeria, and
(2) his letter to the U.S. Department of Justice denying that plaintiff was
authorized to represent Nigeria in the subject matter of the alleged retention
agreement. 49 Once those acts were presumed to be valid, as required by the
doctrine, the bulk of the claims had to be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.50

44. 2017 WL 354847, at *19 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2017).
45. 234 F. Supp. 3d 212, 216 (D.D.C. 2017).
46. Id. at 242.
47. Id. at 243.
48. MAU Consultants 1, Inc. v. Republic of Peru, 245 F. Supp. 3d 486, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
49. 238 F. Supp. 3d 17, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2017).
50. Id. at 33.
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International Discovery

A.

OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN

[VOL. 52

PROCEEDINGS

In 2017, U.S. courts continued to address whether the availability of
discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) for use in a foreign proceeding applies
when the proceeding is a private commercial arbitration. 51 Previously, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit
held that it does not, citing the statute's legislative history and concerns that
"[o]pening the door to the type of discovery" permitted by § 1782 in private
arbitrations would undermine their speed and cost-effectiveness.52 But, in
late 2016 and 2017, three district courts ruled that proceedings governed by
the London Maritime Arbitration Association (LMAA), a private arbitration
institution, fall within the statute's scope. 53 In support, each cited the
Supreme Court's conclusion in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,

that European Commission investigatory proceedings are covered by the
statute. 54 In one such case, a district court of the Southern District of New
York concluded that the Second Circuit's contrary holding that private
arbitrations should not be within the scope of § 1782 was issued before Intel
and had not been revisited by the Circuit.55
In other notable § 1782 decisions, the Second Circuit held that to satisfy
the statute's "for use" requirement, an applicant need only establish the
"practical ability to inject the requested information" into the foreign
proceeding.56 And a court of the Southern District of New York examined
personal jurisdiction under the statute, and found that a corporate entity
must be subject to the court's jurisdiction under DaimlerAG v. Bauman to
"reside" or be "found" in a district for purposes of § 1782.57
51. 'While most courts agree that § 1782 applies to investment treaty arbitrations, there is no
consensus that it covers purely private arbitrations. Compare In re Winning (HK) Shipping Co.
Ltd., No. 09-22659, 2010 WL 1796579, at *8 10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2010) with In re Grupo
Unidos Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14-mc-00226-MSK-KMT, 2015 WL 1810135, at *7 8 (D.
Colo. Apr. 17, 2015).
52. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 191 92 (2d Cir. 1999); see
also Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999). Among
Courts of Appeals, only the Eleventh Circuit has held that § 1782 does apply to private
arbitrations, although it later issued a superseding opinion in which it disclaimed that holding.
In re Cosorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A., 685 F.3d 987, 996 97 (11th Cir. 2012),
superseded by 747 F.3d 1262, 1270 n.4 (11th Cir. 2014)
53. In re Pola Maritime, Ltd., No. CV 416-333, 2017 WL 3714032 at *10 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 29,
2017); In re Kleimar N.V., No. 17-cv-01287, 2017 WL 3386115 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017); In re
Kleimar N.V., 220 F. Supp. 3d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
54. 542 U.S. 241, 257 58 (2004).
55. In re Kleimar, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 521. The Fifth Circuit, post-Intel, has affirmed its earlier
view that § 1782 does not apply to private arbitrations, albeit in a non-precedential opinion. El
Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341 F. App'x 31, 33 34
(5th Cir. 2009).
56. In re Accent Delight Int'l Ltd., 869 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2017).
57. In re Sargeant, No. 17mc374, 2017 WL 4512366, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2017).
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OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S.

PROCEEDINGS

U.S. courts consider whether to order discovery abroad for use in U.S.
proceedings pursuant to the discretionary factors outlined in Societe Nationale
IndustrielleAerospatiale v. U.S. District Courtfor the Southern District of Iowa.58

A particular concern is the impact of a foreign jurisdiction's "blocking
statute" (purporting to bar discovery compliance by its nationals) as part of
the comity analysis.

In Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco &

Foods, LLP, the federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois
ordered the production of documents located in France despite a blocking
statute that sought to prohibit such production, reasoning that France did
not typically enforce the statute, which, the Court speculated, might have
been enacted merely to frustrate U.S. discovery practice.59 A federal district
court in California reached a similar result in Connex Railroad LLC v. AXA
Corporate Solutions Assurance.60

VI.
A.

ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law
STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

In October 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorarion whether
the warrant provisions of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2712, apply extraterritorially to data stored at Microsoft's
datacenter in Ireland.61 In 2016, the Second Circuit reversed a lower court
order refusing to quash a subpoena, and held that the presumption against

extraterritoriality barred application of the SCA to data stored abroad even if
controlled by a U.S. entity.62 In seeking certiorari, the Solicitor General

argued that the Second Circuit "seriously misinterpreted" the SCA, and that
its decision conflicts with "the unanimous holdings of courts that a domestic
recipient of a subpoena is required to produce specified materials within the
recipient's control, even if the recipient stores the materials abroad."63

B.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

In Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., the Supreme Court reversed a

decision of the Federal Circuit and held that supplying a single component
58. 482 U.S. 522, n.28 (1987).
59. No. 16 C 3401, 2017 VL 4287205, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017).
60. No. CV-16-02368, 2017 VL3433542, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017) (holding that
France's interest in upholding its blocking statute does not outweigh the U.S. interest in
obtaining discovery).
61. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17 2, 2017 VL 2869958, at *1(U.S. Oct. 16,
2017).
62. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (analyzed in last year's Year
in Review).
63. Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2, at 11-12 (U.S. June
23, 2017).
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of a multi-component patented invention for assembly outside of the United
States does not constitute patent infringement.64 Promega had sublicensed a
patented kit for genetic testing to Life Technologies for use in certain
applications.65 Life Technologies manufactured one of five parts of a kit in
the United States and exported it to the U.K., where the components were
assembled to perform the tests. When Life Technologies began selling
outside the licensed field of use, Promega sued for patent infringement
under section 271(f)(1) of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), which
prohibits the supply from the United States of "all or a substantial portion of
the components of a [patented] invention" for combination abroad.66 The
Supreme Court held that a single component "does not constitute all or a
substantial portion" of a multi-component invention" under section
271(f)(1). The Court noted that "the effect of this provision was to fill a gap
in the enforceability of patent rights by reaching components that are
manufactured in the United States but assembled overseas and that were
beyond the reach of the statute in its prior formulation."67
In Geophysical Services, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., the Fifth
Circuit held that the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., does not apply
to extraterritorial conduct, and therefore bars a contributory infringement
claim when it is based on the domestic authorization of entirely
extraterritorial conduct.68 Aligning itself with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Subaflms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.,69 the court held that the
Copyright Act does not permit a contributory infringement claim predicated
on direct infringement that occurred entirely extraterritorially.70
C.

FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS

The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of a claim
brought under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in Hernandez v. Mesa, a
case where a U.S. Border Patrol agent standing on the U.S. side of the
71
border shot and killed a Mexican teenager standing on the Mexican side.
Declining to rule on the merits of the extraterritoriality question, the
Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to address the predicate
question of whether Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal NarcoticsAgents,72 which
recognized an implied right of action for damages alleged to have violated a
citizen's constitutional rights, would even permit such a claim.73 The Court
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

137 S. Ct. 734, 739 (2017).
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 743.
850 F.3d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 2017)
24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Geographical Serv., 850 F.3d at 799.
137 S. Ct. 2003, 2004 (2017) (grant of certiorari analyzed in last year's Year-in-Review).
403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006.
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observed that its recent decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi,74 which clarified the
"special factors" a court should evaluate before permitting a Bivens action to
proceed, could bear upon Hernandez.75
Justice Thomas dissented. He would have held that Bivens does not apply
in these circumstances. 76 In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer countered that
Hernandez was protected by the Fourth Amendment because, based on an
objective assessment, the patrol agent did not know whether he was shooting
at an American citizen or whether the bullet would land in the United States
or Mexican territory.77 In Justice Breyer's view, not applying the Fourth
Amendment based solely on the location of the injury relative to the
borderline would create anomalous precedent.78
VII.

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

In U.S. courts, the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, otherwise known as the "New
York Convention," governs the recognition and enforcement of most foreign
arbitral awards. 79 State law, however, governs the recognition and
enforcement of foreign court judgments.
A.

FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

In CBF Industria De Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., the Second Circuit
held that the New York Convention and FAA Chapter two do not require
that petitioners first seek confirmation of a foreign arbitral award before that
award can be recognized and enforced in U.S. federal court. 80 Instead, the
court explained, recognition and enforcement is a single-step process, as the
New York Convention eliminated the Geneva Convention's requirement
that a petitioner first confirm a foreign award at the arbitration's seat before
the award can be enforced elsewhere. 81
74. 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1849-50 (2017).
75. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006 07.
76. Id. at 2008 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2009 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2010.
79. 21 U.S.T. 2517. The Convention is implemented in U.S. law through Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 08 (2013). The Inter-American Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration governs the recognition and enforcement of awards if
a majority of the parties to an arbitration agreement are citizens of states that have ratified it.
The Inter-American Convention is implemented in Chapter 3 of the FAA.
80. CBF Industria De Gusa S/A, et al. v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., et al., 850 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.
2017).
81. Id. at 72 73. By contrast, a "nondomestic arbitral award" one rendered in the United
States, but under foreign law or involving foreign parties or property
must first be
"confirmed" by a U.S. court, becoming a court judgment that is then entitled to full faith and
credit in any other U.S. court. Id. at 73 74. In practical terms, this yields the same result as
recognition of a foreign award an enforceable U.S. court judgment.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

Published by SMU Scholar, 2018

11

The Year in Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2018], Art. 13

THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
202

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 52

In Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Second
Circuit considered, as a matter of national first impression, the interplay
between the FSIA and the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, ultimately concluding that the
FSIA is the sole basis for jurisdiction (subject matter and personal) over
actions to enforce ICSID awards against foreign states, and that the FSIA's
service and venue requirements must be satisfied before an ICSID award can
be enforced.82 The court found that the ICSID Convention cannot be read
to independently confer subject matter jurisdiction over a sovereign, and
that, even if it could, Congress had made clear by subsequently enacting the
FSIA that ICSID enforcement actions are subject to the FSIA's sovereign
immunity protections and related rules.83
In Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. Ltd. v. Gov't of the Lao People's
Democratic Republic, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that U.S. courts sitting as
a secondary jurisdiction should only enforce an arbitral award annulled at
the seat of the arbitration in rare circumstances, such as if the annulment
decision itself is contrary to U.S. public policy.84 The court clarified that
this principle is applicable equally to an enforcement action as a proceeding
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) seeking to vacate a judgment
enforcing an arbitral award on the basis of the award's subsequent
annulment at the seat. In such a vacatur case, the court explained, "the full
range of Rule 60(b) considerations" should be considered,85 and the fact that
an award has been annulled at the seat should be "given significant weight."86
B.

FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS

In Iraq Middle Market Development v. Mohammad Harmoosh, the Fourth
Circuit held as a matter of first impression that the Maryland Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act's arbitration clause exception
does not apply to prevent a judgment creditor from enforcing a judgment
when the judgment debtor waived its contractual right to arbitrate by
litigating its dispute in foreign courts. 87 The court based its reasoning on
the fact that adopting the opposite interpretation would lead to the
inconsistent result that "parties' decision to forego arbitration and litigate in
domestic courts would bind them, while a similar decision to litigate in a
foreign court would not." 88

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

863 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 112.
864 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 176.
Id. at 186.
848 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 240.
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Forum Non Conveniens

United States courts applying forum non conveniens struggled with the
question of whether the analysis should compare the foreign forum with the
United States generally, or specifically the individual state chosen by the
plaintiff. United States courts also struggled with questions regarding the
deference afforded to the plaintiffs choice of forum. In fact, in cases
decided just weeks apart, the Ninth Circuit alone took diametrically opposite
approaches on these questions. In Cooper v. Tokyo Electric Power Company,
Inc., plaintiff members of the U.S. Navy, many but not all of whom were
California residents, brought a class action suit against Tokyo Electric Power
Company, Inc. (TEPCO), alleging that their exposure to radiation while
providing aid related to the tsunami that damaged the Fukushima nuclear
power plant was due to TEPCO's negligence.89
On TEPCO's motion dismiss on forum non conveniens and other grounds,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California agreed that
most of the witnesses and documents were in Japan and that it would be
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain testimony from non-party witnesses in the
United States. The court nonetheless concluded that these considerations
did not "outweigh Plaintiffs' interests in suing at home."90 In denying the
motion, the court concluded that the public interest factors were neutral
because while Japan had an interest in centralizing litigation relating to the
incident, the United States had an interest in compensating service
members, and that the litigation would be burdensome on either country's
courts. 9 1 On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that
"[p]laintiffs are U.S. citizens, and their decision to sue in the United States
must be respected."92 While the plaintiffs sued in California, rather than
compare suit in Japan with suit in California, the Cooper court weighed the
convenience of suit in Japan with suit in the United States generally. It
afforded deference because the plaintiffs were U.S. citizens, without noting
that only some were citizens of California.
Two weeks later, in Ayco Farms, Inc. v. Ochoa, the Ninth Circuit issued a
forum non conveniens decision in a lawsuit brought in California by a U.S.
citizen, this time affirming the lower court's motion to dismiss. 93 Plaintiff
Ayco, a Florida corporation, entered into a partnership with two citizens of
Mexico to create AFM, which would buy or grow produce that Ayco would
then market or sell worldwide.94 The Mexican defendants were also officers
in an importing agency with whom Ayco had an exclusivity agreement, and
allegedly breached that agreement by diverting produce.95 The U.S. District
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

860 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1211.
Id.
Id.
862 F.3d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 947-48.
Id. at 948
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Court for the Central District of California granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens because Mexico was an adequate forum
and because Ayco lacked contacts specifically with California.96
On appeal, Ayco argued that the district court had improperly weighed
the benefits and burdens of litigation in Mexico versus California
specifically, rather than the United States as a whole, and that the district
court had afforded inadequate deference to its choice to litigate in
California.97 In apparent contrast with its Cooper analysis, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, holding that it was not improper for the district court
to have focused specifically on California and, in any event, "it is not clear
how a convenience comparison between a foreign forum and the United
States as a whole could be carried out in most cases."98 It also determined
that while a plaintiff is usually entitled to deference for his choice of forum,
"[a] U.S. citizen plaintiff is entitled to less deference in his choice of forum if
he does not reside in that forum." 99

IX.
A.

Parallel Proceedings
INTERNATIONAL ABSTENTION

Under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, a federal
court may stay or dismiss a lawsuit in light of a concurrent legal or parallel
proceeding only if the court first determines that the actions in question are
indeed parallel, and then that there are exceptional circumstances such that
abstention would promote "wise judicial administration."oo Federal courts
apply the Colorado River doctrine in deciding whether to abstain in light of
parallel foreign litigation.
In Deb v. SIR VA Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana rejected a defense motion to dismiss in light of pending litigation in
Canada because, even though the lawsuits involved the same plaintiff and the
same alleged failure to perform contractual services, the defendants had "not
presented any evidence establishing the relationship between themselves and
• ..the defendant in the Canadian action." 10 The court also rejected as
legally unsupported the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs failure to
join the defendants in the Canadian action was a relevant factor under
Colorado River.02 The court further found that the resolution of the
Canadian lawsuit would not have any impact on the issue presented in the
case before the U.S. court because the two issues involve institutional
relationships (namely, a joint venture) between different parties.03
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 948-49.
Id. at 949-950.
Id. at 950.
424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
No. 13-cv-01245, 2017 WL 3980574, at *9-10 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 11, 2017).
Id.
Id. at *10.
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In Global Tech Indus. Group, Inc. v. Go Fun Group Holdings, the federal
district court for the Southern District of New York denied a defendant's
motion to dismiss in light of parallel litigation in Hong Kong because, it
stated, its task under Colorado River was "not to articulate a justification for
the exercise of jurisdiction, but rather to determine whether exceptional
circumstances exist that justify the surrender of that jurisdiction."104 After
balancing the relevant factors under the Colorado River test, the court found
no "exceptional circumstances" to justify abstention, noting that commercial
litigation involving foreign parties and foreign assets is not unusual in federal
courts. 105 The court also noted that although the Hong Kong action was
filed first, that action sought only "declaratory relief in response to a direct
threat of litigation," and therefore the general preference of deferring to the
first-filed action did not apply.106
B.

ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

In 1st Source Bank v. Neto, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's
refusal to enter an anti-suit injunction despite the fact that the parties and
issues in parallel Indiana and Brazil lawsuits, each seeking recovery on the
same debt arising from the same transaction, were the same. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that it was not "vexatious or oppressive" for the plaintiff to
have filed a lawsuit in Brazil after minimal discovery proceedings in the
United States. 07 The Seventh Circuit agreed with other federal courts of
appeals that the "standard for antisuit injunctive relief differs . . .from the
traditional preliminary injunction standard in that the anti-suit injunction
test "does not rely on a showing of likelihood of success on the merits."0s
Rather, "factors specific to the propriety of an antisuit injunction" focus on
whether (1) "the parties and the issues are the same" and (2) "the first action
is dispositive of the action to be enjoined."109 If both factors are met, the
court must then consider whether allowing two lawsuits to proceed would be
"gratuitously duplicative" or "vexatious and oppressive.",0 The Circuit
observed that "a district court should issue an international antisuit
injunction only when the interest in avoiding vexatious litigation outweighs
the international-comity concerns inherent in enjoining a party from
pursuing claims in a foreign court.""'

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182019, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2017).
Id. at *11.
Id. at *13.
861 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 613 (citing E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir.

2006)).
109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
111. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 13-CV-04087, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
81396 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2014)).
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